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Abstract
Equilibrium prices of options are abritrage prices in economies in
which prices are determined endogenously and all agents are price takers.
We show that the price taking assumption in options' markets is unreason-
able because by not being a price taker a small agent can gain much.

Black and Scholes (1973) considered the problem of option pricing in an
economy with two securities. In their model the prices of these securities are
given exogenously by
(1) B(t) = ert , S(t) = eat + b w(t)
where {W(t); 0<_t<_T} is a standard Brownian Mortion. In this economy it is
assumed that traders can trade continously without transaction costs.
The Black and Scholes result implies that a generalized option (contingent
claim) that pays at date t = T, f(S(T)) dollars, has a unique, reasonable
price. One can show that a trader can form a portfolio of the two securities,
change this portfolio continously in the interval [0,T], in such a way that
buying an additional amount of one security is financed by selling an amount of
the other security of equal value (i.e., the trading strategy used is self
financing), so that the payoff at date t = T is f(S(T)) dollars with
probability one. The value of this portfolio at t = is called the arbitrage
price of the claim at date t = 0.
A trader in this economy will agree to sell any number of options at
prices which are a bit higher than their arbitrage price, knowing that a sure
profit can be made by duplicating the cash flow of the option at date t = T by
trading continously in the securities 3 and S. Therefore if options are traded
in this economy their arbitrage prices will be their equilibrium prices.
In the Black and Scholes model it is assumed implicity that the trading in
options does not affect the prices of the securities. Since, in this model, the
basic securities prices are given exogenously, this assumption is reasonable.
However to study the reasonableness as well as the implications of this
assumption, a model in which both option prices and security prices are
determined endogenously is needed.
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In this paper we examine the arbitrage method in an economy in which
securities prices are the result of the agents efforts to maximize their
utility. An example of this type of economy is described by Kreps (1979) or
Harrison and Kreps (1979). We shall consider in this paper an economy which
is a special case of the economy described by Kreps (1979)
.
In Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Kreps (1979) an economy in which equi-
librium prices of the securities can be given by (1) was developed. In
their model all agents are assumed to be price takers. This assumption
implies that trading in options does not affect the prices of the securities
and also that the equilibrium prices of the options are their arbitrage
prices. The assumption that agents are price takers is very strong and
inconsistent since it is assumed that the traders are, in all other respects,
very sophisticated. Hence one would expect that if prices can be manipulated
by options trading these agents will in fact manipulate them.
In this paper we consider the problem of whether, in the Harrison-
Kreps economy (when a large number of options can be traded) , it is reasonable
to assume that agents are price takers believing that prices of the basic
securities are determined by (1) . In effect we study whether price taking
behavior is reasonable in the sense that by not accepting the "equilibrium"
security prices a small agent can gain a lot or even corner the market and
thus, in effect, make a pronounced change in the "equilibrium" securities
prices
.
In order to study this question we assume that all agents but one
believe that no matter what options they sell, the prices of the basic
securities do not change. They are therefore willing to sell any option
at a little higher than its arbitrage price on the belief that they can
make arbitrage profits.
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It will be shown that there are certain arbitrarily inexpensive options
such that the one remaining agent, by buying one of these options at date t =
at its arbitrage price, (or a bit higher) , can gain a lot, to the detriment of
those who sold him this option, by not behaving as a price taker after date t =
0. If all agents anticipate this, no agent would sell options at their
arbitrage prices, and all agents would want to buy certain options at their
arbitrage price (or slightly higher).
The key to this argument is that a single agent, investing a small amount
of funds, can reap enormous profits, if this agent does not take prices as
given. Thus assuming price-taking in a "large-but-finite" economy of this sort
is unwarranted. (A similar sort of result is obtained by Hart (1979). Hart
shows that when short-selling is permitted in securities markets, firms that
are small but not infinites imally small can have large effects on the economy.
Hence "price taking" behavior is not appropriate in his model, as well.) Since
price taking is shown to be unreasonable, one wonders what is a reasonable way
to define equilibrium for such economies. This question is beyond the scope of
this paper and will not be discussed.
This might be an explanation for the fact that the option pricing model fails
to predict prices of options that are well out of the money in real markets. The
reason suggested in this paper for the occurrence of this phenomenon is that the
behavior of real world traders for well out of the money options is not approximated
well by the price taking assumption.
In Section 2 we describe an economy which is a special case of the economy
described by Kreps. In Section 3 we construct our example. In Section 4 some
concluding remarks are made.
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2. The Economy
Consider an economy with one consumption good that can be consumed only at
time t = 1 , with two securities that are actually state contingent claims on
the conumption good at t = 1
.
A probability space (ft,F,P) is given, and weft represents a state of the
world.
At time t = 1 , the securities pay
P^l.w) = er , P 2 (1,w) = e
a+b W(1
'
w)
>
where r, a, and b are constants, and W = (W(t); 0<_ t<_1} is a standard Brownian
motion on (Q,F,P). Denote by F
fc
the a algebra generated by (W(u) ; 0£u<tl and
assume that F^
= p. Each agent is informed at time t which sets BeF contain
the true state of the world.
There are N identical agents who consume at time t = 1. At time t =
each agent holds 1/N of both securities.
Assume prices of the securities at time t, if the state i3 w, are given by
p /. >. rt p /,. \ at + b W(t,w) rr>\
*l(t,w) = e , P2^»w^ = © Kd)
i
Assume agent i can hold at time t, q (t,w) of security j, as long as he
is using admissible self-financing trading strategies, as defined in Harrison
and Kreps (1979).
Agent i will choose an admissible self-financing trading strategy (q
1 ,q 2 )
to maximize
U K(1,w)e r + q2(1,w)e a+b W( 1 ' w) ) dP(w),
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over all the admissible self financing trading strategies, where U, the agent's
utility function, is a strictly concave function defined on the real line.
We assume further that there exists a function g(h) such that g(h) -* as
h •* and
h U(-h" 1 g(h)) - — , as h + 0.
Assume also that prices (2) are equilibrium prices in the sense that
N
I Qj(t,w) = 1 J * 1,2 0<t<1
is1
Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Kreps (1979) show that if the equilibrium prices
of the basic securities are given by (2) , then the equilibrium prices of any
options that are traded (in zero net supply) will be their arbitrage prices.
We will show that if a large number of options are traded, then the
assumption that agents are price takers, believing that the prices of the basic
securities are determined by (2) , is unreasonable.
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3. An Example
Let C(x,P
2 ,t) be the Black-Scholes prices at time t of the European call
option with striking price x (that pays (Pp(l) - x) at t=1). Assume that
options with striking prices x, x+h and x-h are traded, where x and h are
further described below.
Suppose agents 2, 3, • •'•, N agree at time t = to trade options with
agent 1 in exchange for the appropriate "hedge portfolios" of the stock and
the bond. If agent 1 pays a bit more bond for the transaction, the other
agents will be happy to make this transaction because they think they will
make arbitrage profits.
Agent 1 buys from all other agents g(h)h~ 2 options with striking prices
x+h and x-h, and agent 1 sells 2g(h)h~ 2 options with striking price x. Thus
agent 1 purchases the contingent claim
g(h)h-2 ((P
2 (i) _ x+h) + - 2(P2 (1) - x) + + (P 2 (l) - x - h) + ).
The payoff of this claim as a function of P
? (1) is depicted in figure 1
The "price" of this package of options (at the Black-Scholes prices) is
g(h) h "2 (C(x+h,P
2 ,o) - 2C(x,P 2 ,0) + C(x-h,P 2 ,0) )
,
or, approximately, g(h) — C(x,P_ o) . This is small if h is small.
3X2
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Figure 1: payoff of the contingent claim at date t=l
P
2 (D
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The payment to agents 2, 3, . .
.
, N at t = includes
g(h)h" 2 (^|-(C(x-h,P
2
,0) -2C(x,P
2
,0) + C(x+h,P
2
,0))
of security 2. This is approximately
g(h) —2 =-C(x,P
2 ,0) ,
3P
2
3 x
and is also small if h is small. Thus agent 1, in exchange for the "tent"'
depicted in figure 1, has given up a small amount of both the stock and the
bond.
As h -*• 0, therefore, even if agent 1 does not trade after t = 0, the
expected utility from this portfolio will be, at worst, a bit less than
before the options' transaction.
Agents 2 through N expect to make money by continuously trading with
agent 1, in order to carry out the Black-Scholes hedge. But suppose agent 1,
after time 0, announces that he will no longer engage in such trades. If
agent 1 stays out of the market after date t = 0, the other agents must then
trade among themselves. As time passes and securities' prices change, the
other agents try to buy and sell securities in order to hedge their portfolio.
But since they are identical, nobody will sell. If agent 1 never trades with
them again, they wind up (at time 1) with a little extra of both the stock and
the bond, and they are short the "tent" depicted in figure 1. The extra stock
and bond raises their utility slightly, but the "tent" lowers their expected
utility by a term on the order of h U(-g(h)h ). That is, with probability
on the order of h, they must make good on the "tent," lowering their consump-
tion by this amount. For small enough h, our assumption on U ensures that
they view this as a precarious position indeed. What will happen at this
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point we cannot say precisely, because agent 1 finds himself in the position
of a monopolist. There are clearly gains to trade between agent 1 and all
the rest, and as agent 1 holds the key to those gains, we expect that he will
extract much of the surplus. That is, agent 1 will at some time before t = 1
trade again, but on very favorable terms.
This example can be altered by assuming that only agent 2 agrees to sell
(or buy) every option to (from). agent 1 at its arbitrage price. Agent 1 will sell
the claim (with a very small h) to agent 2 and then will get out of the market.
If securities prices change agent 2 would like to buy and sell securities in
order to hedge his portfolio. Since agent 1 is out of the market the demand
for these securities will be different than the demand in the case in which
agent 1 is trading. So prices will change. Agent 2 will observe he can
not hedge this portfolio using the arbitrage method. He will then be willing
to buy back the claim at a loss. The other agents can gain a little by
selling agent 2 some of the claims at a high price. However, they cannot
sell too much because the moment they sell this claim they would be in the
same trouble as agent 2. Agent 1 is the only one in the economy who can sell
large quantities of this claim, and thus can gain much. This example can
also be generalized to the case in which the agents are not identical and
also instead of one agent of type 1 and one agent of type 2 there are several
agents of both kinds.
The conclusion is that an agent who buys the above claim, with h small
enough, can gain. Moreover, it is unimportant from whom he buys. Therefore,
if everything else remains the same, all agents would like to buy this claim
at its arbitrage price while nobody would be willing to sell at that price.
We do not know what the market equilibrium will be but we do know what it
will not be.
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4 . Conclusion
The prices (2) of the basic securities together with the arbitrage prices
of the options are an equilibrium in an economy of the kind described by Kreps
in which all agents are price takers. The price taking assumption is usually
made in the case in which a small agent cannot gain very much by not being a
price taker. This is certainly not the case here.
Although the example in Section 3 is pathological (when h is very small)
,
it demonstrates, in an extreme case, what may happen in less pathological
cases. Prices (2) of the basic securities together with the arbitrage prices
of the options, may be reasonable equilibrium prices if only a small number
of options are allowed to be traded. However if many options are traded it
seems that the equilibrium of price takers is no longer reasonable and an
equilibrium which takes into account the possibility of manipulation is needed.
In Section 3 we could have used out of the money call options instead of
the option described there. There is evidence that in real options' markets
the prices of options that are very well out of the money are much higher than
predicted by the Black Scholes model. The sort of "market manipulation"
described in this paper may provide an explanation for this phenomena.
The example of this paper is not unique to prices given by (1) but can
be generalized to prices given by much more general stochastic processes.
Furthermore a similar example can be constructed for a discrete time model
like the one given in Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979).
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